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The subject of one’s financial remuneration is usually a hush-hush matter – perhaps more so when the amount in
question might be described as gratuitous or even obscene. In Japan, the issue of CEO pay came under the spotlight
in July 2010, after securities regulators required companies to disclose pay for executives earning more than 100
million yen (approx. US$1.2 million).
A big surprise from this exercise, however, has been how few Japanese leaders actually take home super-sized pay
cheques, unlike their U.S. counterparts. According to PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), fewer than 300 people from
Japan's 3,813 public companies earned enough in 2009 to require disclosure.
Companies listed on Japan's stock exchanges paid their CEOs an average of US$580,000 in salary and other
compensation in the fiscal year 2009, PwC estimated – about 16 times more than the typical Japanese worker.
Compare that to the US$3.5 million average CEO pay from 3,000 of the largest U.S. companies  (including stock
options and bonuses), according to the Corporate Library, a research and rating firm – an amount almost 86 times
the country's national average wage.
It was no surprise then that some have called on Corporate America to take their cues from the Japanese.
To examine this issue more closely, Toru Yoshikawa
(http://www.business.smu.edu.sg/faculty/strategy_organisation/toru.asp), an associate professor of strategic
management at SMU, worked with two other researchers to uncover links between firm strategy and executive
compensation, along with the moderating role of foreign ownership within Japanese firms.
The Money Talk
Executive compensation is an important mechanism that aligns the interests of managers and shareholders. Past
studies have examined its determinants and performance effects with the most researched question in this area
being the link between executive compensation and firm performance.
However, few empirical examinations have been carried out outside of the U.S. Most studies, moreover, give little
emphasis on national differences. "It is being recognised that in explaining organizational decisions and actions,
institutional differences may be even more important… executive compensation practice is one area that is
particularly institutionally embedded,” the researchers said.
In their paper 'The impact of firm strategy and foreign ownership on executive bonus compensation in Japanese
firms' (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0148296310001177), published in the Journal of Business
Research, the researchers examined the relationship between two important strategic decisions of firms- R&D
investment and diversification, and executive bonus payment.
The case for a relationship between firm strategy and executive compensation can be made from an information-
processing perspective.
Firm strategy is likely to be one of the key determinants of the level of executive compensation because business
strategies have different levels of complexity and hence, varying levels of demand for information processing.
Since the ability to process complex information is a valuable resource when it comes to strategising, managers with
such competence are likely to be paid higher compensation, the researchers hypothesised.
R&D investment, a strategy critical for the long-term competitiveness of a firm, usually leads to high levels of
information processing demands in managers for three reasons.
First, R&D investments are typically associated with high levels of risk or outcome uncertainty. Second, the lead
times in many R&D projects are very long. Third, R&D activity may require high degrees of coordination among
different departments as well as the more complex task of managing technical staff.
This means that the need to process large amounts of complex information, outcome uncertainty, long term
horizons, and high overall risk lead to higher levels of executive compensation.
Another strategy that is likely to increase the information-processing demands on managers is product
diversification. Because it increases the scope of the firm and the range of strategic decisions that managers have
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to make; tasks become more complex, thus lending to a case for higher executive compensation.
While investors would want to reward managers who undertake R&D investments because of the potential it can
bring for a company, the researchers proposed a third hypothesis that foreign investors are unlikely to encourage
diversification as it will be more difficult for them to monitor a wide range of product areas.
Furthermore, empirical research has revealed links between conglomerate diversification and a reduction in
shareholder wealth.
“Investors, therefore, have an incentive to penalize managers who attempt to diversify excessively by reducing their
compensation,” the researchers said.
In the study, they analysed salary data from the 200 largest industrial firms in sales from the 1990-1997 period to
eliminate the effects of stock options which were legalized in 1997 as part of compensation. The General Method of
Moments – an estimation technique – was used in the analysis models for data review.
How a CEO Gets More Pay
The researchers found that both R&D investment and product diversification are significant predictors of executive
bonus payments.
“These results are consistent with our argument that the Japanese contextual factors reward executives for
choosing strategies for long-term competitiveness and growth,” they reported. “Thus, despite the lack of active
managerial labour market in Japan, our results indicate that such strategies command a premium in executive
payment.”
When foreign investors are in the picture, executives undertaking diversification received lower bonuses, reflecting
investors' preferences for shorter term gains.
The hypothesis that foreign ownership would have a positive moderating effect on the relationship between R&D
investment and executive bonus payments was, however, disproved.
One possible explanation could involve the appropriateness of bonus payments as a result of R&D investments.
Since R&D is a long term investment, often taking up to ten years before outcomes can be known and benefits
realised, short-term cash bonus may be seen as an appropriate way to compensate executives.
“Further, R&D investments, because of their highly technical nature, are more difficult for outsiders such as investors
to access, because they often do not posses technological knowledge and expertise to do so. Therefore, investors
are unlikely to encourage short-term cash bonus in such situations,” elaborated the researchers.
They stressed that the results “do not warrant an interpretation that foreign investors are myopic with regard to
R&D investments” but that they “may have reservations about using short-term cash bonus payments as a means to
bring about incentive alignment with regard to R&D investments that are informationally complex, long term in terms
of time horizon and of uncertain outcomes”.
These findings could thus offer supporting evidence for the applicability of the information-processing perspective to
the strategy-pay relationship in the Japanese context.
Generally, when Japanese executives choose to increase R&D investment or engage in diversification strategy, their
bonus payment also increased during the period from 1990 to 1997. This suggests that heavy cognitive demands on
executives were compensated through larger bonus payment.
“This is an interesting result, because external labour market for senior executives is not as developed in Japan as in
the US and also because Japanese firms tend to emphasise firm-specific skills and experience,” the researchers said.
“Our results imply that even in such a context, managerial human capital is valued and compensated through bonus
payments.”
Results of the study should, however, be taken together with the fact that the study had only focused on the
1990-1997 period as it was designed to eliminate the effect of stock options. It is also important to note that R&D
investment and product diversification were employed as strategy variables.
Finally, the researchers noted a need for more academic inquiry on executive compensation and its implications –
particularly comparative studies that examine these relationships across national contexts and time periods.
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